



ALMA MATER STUDIORUM
UNIVERSITÀ DI BOLOGNA
SCUOLA DI ECONOMIA, MANAGEMENT E STATISTICA

AICCON

Working Paper 182

Commonism and Capabilities

Diego Lanzi

Dipartimento di Scienze Politiche e Sociali, Università di Bologna

+39 0543 62327
ecofo.aiccon@unibo.it
www.aiccon.it

 **aiccon**
cooperazione | non profit

AICCON – Italian Association for the Promotion of the Culture of Co-operation and of Nonprofit is an association formed in 1997 among the **University of Bologna, Faculty of Economics, Forlì Campus**, within the academic course on Social Economy. The aim of the Association is to encourage, support, and organise initiatives to promote the culture of solidarity with particular attention to idealities, perspectives, activities, and problems connected to Nonprofit Organizations and Co-operative Enterprises.

AICCON is part of network of people and institutions (**EMES Network**) at national and international level that, starting from its members, forms the environment in which it is located. AICCON, throughout the years, has increased its reach and succeeds to the local, national and international context in which it works.

Commonism and Capabilities

Diego Lanzi*

February 21, 2020

Abstract

The paper is focused on how to approach commons management and preservation issues without using of market institutions. For doing this, we adopt a Marxian viewpoint and endorse a contemporary political theory called *commonism*. Firstly, we discuss why commons are not commodities and introduce commonism's main pillars. Secondly, we briefly out-sketch main influences of Marx's thought on Amartya Sen's *capability approach* and why Sen's theory can be useful to refine some theoretical aspects of commonism. Finally, Elinor Ostrom's design principle for self-governing, common-pool resources institutions are intertwined with capabilitarianism in order to define some capabilities for commons.

1 Introduction

In recent times, there has been a growing debate on common-pool resources, the commons, and on the design of institutions aimed to govern and manage them. Well-known examples of commons are: groundwater basins, forests, ocean fisheries, clean air, mainframe computers, software code, planetary climate control, international political institutions and settlements, immaterial collective infrastructures and the Internet; and the kind of unitary resource individuals derive from commons can vary from air and water to information bits or budget allocations (Blomqvist and Ostrom (1985)).

Such an increasing interest in common-pool resources finds motivation, *inter alia*, in the attempt to solve a classic problem of their provision and usage: the Hardin's *tragedy*. In his famous article on *Science*, Hardin (1968) predicted the massive deforestation in tropical countries, or the collapse of several ocean fisheries, socially-dramatic outcomes that would have resulted from systematic over-usage of the commons caused by not-internalized (negative) social externalities. Like in Prisoner's Dilemma game situations, collectively optimal individual decisions about commons usage contrast with individual rationality dictates. Individual choices will be socially harmful, leading to over-usage and

*Department of Political and Social Science, University of Bologna

impoverishment of common-pool resources¹. Consistently, given that individuals are trapped in dilemma-like settings, public authorities have to impose a set of institutions for internalizing these externalities. In principle, these institutions can include governmental, top-down regulations, systems based on private property and relative prices, or everything in the middle, even if, as Ostrom's seminal works have clearly argued, given common goods' distinguishing features, self-organized, bottom-up governance systems are largely preferable to other institutional solutions².

In Hardin's tragedy, however, common-pool resources have decreasing marginal returns or, that is the same, marginal benefits of usage are strictly decreasing. If this is the case, negative externalities value generates a positive difference between individual marginal benefits and social marginal benefits, and such a deviation explains the over-usage outcome of the tragedy script. But, what if common goods exhibit increasing returns and generate not negative, but positive external effects?

As Rose (1986) explains, the tragedy turns into comedy: the so-called the "*cornucopia of the commons*"³. Because of positive externalities, marginal social benefits of usage are now not lower than individual marginal benefits and both of them are positively sloped. In this case, the larger are usage and exploitation of the commons, the wider are social benefits from common-pool resources. Nonetheless, individual incentives to free-ride can be at work and problems of under-investment in developing and maintaining the commons can emerge. Put it differently: even if the tragedy is a comedy, price mechanisms alone cannot be able to deal with positive externalities and to allow the full benefits of commons.

Market skeptics, thereby, point out that:

ecological disaster is the revenge of the markets so-called negative externalities; social development is based on market operations, 'intensifying inequality, with immiseration amidst plentitude'; and networks are, the market's inability to accommodate its own positive externalities, that is, to allow the full benefits of innovations when they overflow market price mechanisms (Dyer-Witthford (2007)).

Market failures in managing and preserving the commons can be explained, *inter alia*, by using some concepts of Marx's political economy. More precisely, Marx's definition of what commodities are and his notion of circuit of capital. As we shall discuss, commons are not commodities in the traditional capitalistic meaning of the term and the circuit of capital cannot operate properly in managing and governing common goods.

In what follows, therefore, we approach commons management and preservation issues without using ideas of market, marginal returns and relative prices. Conversely, we adopt a Marxian viewpoint and endorse a contemporary political theory called *commonism*. The reason is two-fold: on the one hand, commonism's perspective is consistent with the principle of self-governance of

¹ See for a seminal discussion on common-pool resources and game theory Dasgupta (1982).

² See, among others, Ostrom (1990) and (2000).

³ The expression is due to Dan Bricklin.

common-pool resources strongly defended by Ostrom and others scholars; on the other hand, commonism requires that collectivities, groups and associations have the capacity of affect and direct social change, and here, again, the term capacity reminds some classic Marxian ideas recombined by Amartya Sen to create his Capability Approach⁴. Our main aim, therefore, is to combine elements of above theories (e.g. Ostrom's institutional theory, commonism and the Capability Approach) and suggest a starting framework for public reasoning and debate on how to deal with common goods in a post-capitalistic social order.

The organization of the essay is the following. In the next Section, we discuss why commons are not commodities and introduce commonism's main pillars. Some conditions for commonism to be a possible alternative to capitalism as a mode of social organization are emphasized as well. Secondly, in Section 3, we briefly out-sketch main influences of Marx's thought on Amartya Sen's capability approach and why Sen's theory can be useful for refining some theoretical aspects of commonism. Then, in Section 4, we intertwine Ostrom's design principles for self-governing, common-pool resources institutions with capabilitarianism in order to define some capabilities for commons. The last Section, as usual, concludes.

2 Commodities and Commons: from Marx to commonism

Markets and relative price system's inability to manage common-pool resources can be explained by relating the commons to Marx's notion of *commodities*. As Marx wrote:

if commodities could speak, they would say this: our use value may interest men, but it does not belong to us as objects. What does belong to us as objects, however, is our value...we relate to each other merely as exchange values (Marx (1977a)).

In the above statement, the central concern must be placed on what happens when commodities exchange values (i.e. relative prices) *merely* differ from their total/social values because of externalities and/or some intrinsic value components which cannot be quantified in terms of price, exactly like happens for common goods. Following Marx (1981), in the "*circuit of capital*" commodities are exchanged for money, money purchases as commodities labor, materials, machinery etc... and industrial capital produces new commodities by means of commodities. These are sold for more money in a auto-catalytic, self-reinforcing process. The cellular units of capitalistic accumulation are commodities which must be private goods with only instrumental value and exchanged at reliable relative prices. If last conditions do not hold, and exchange values are not social values, capitalistic profit accumulation through the above circuit generates important social costs for populations, collectivizes and communities. Since

⁴See for original Sen's contributions, Sen (1980), (1985) and (1987). For surveys on the capability approach see Roybens (2005), (2011) and (2016).

commons are not commodities, from a radical political economy standpoint, some scholars have stressed that, not only markets and relative price systems will never offer proper solutions to common-pool resource governance issues, but that the whole capitalistic system has to be subverted in order to properly manage the global commons.

For example, Dyer-Witheford (2006), (2007) and de Pauter and Dyer-Witheford (2010) suggest the intriguing idea of *commonism*. As Dyer-Witheford points out:

if the cell form of capitalism is the commodity, the cellular form of a society beyond capital is the common. A commodity is a good produced for sale, a common is a good produced, or conserved, to be shared. The notion of a commodity, a good produced for sale, presupposes private owners between whom the exchange occurs. The notions of the common presupposes collectivities – associations and assemblies – within which sharing is organized. If capitalism presents itself as an immense heap of commodities, commonism is a multiplication of commons (Dyer-Witheford (2007)).

Accordingly to commonism, three different levels of common-pool resources characterize the so-called “*circuit of the common*”: (i) *ecological commons*, i.e. global public goods, or global ecosystem services, which determine the ecology of the planet and of all species living on it (among the others: the biosphere, planetary climate control, fishery reserves, watersheds and freshwater basins, epidemiological care provision or the regulation of the food supply); (ii) *networked digital commons*, i.e. non-rivalrous, common pool, digital technologies that overflow intellectual property regimes (like, for instance, creative commons, open-source systems or peer-to-peer networks); and (iii) *social commons*, i.e. commons for socially-sustainable productive and reproductive work (for example: redistributive social institutions granting equal opportunities, collectively-managed forms of production, like cooperatives, or universal basic income programs).

The Marxist circuit now operates differently: collectivities use shared resources for productive and reproductive activities which create more commons, and these new common goods give raise to new forms of possible peer-to-peer, bottom-up associations. As Dyer-Witheford argues, the above three levels of commons can interact to create self-reinforcing networks of alternative provision in a way that is both ‘aggressive and expansive: proliferating, self-strengthening and diversifying’ (Dyer-Witheford (2007))⁵. Nevertheless, the circuit of common will emerge from social experiments created in resistance to capitalism (de Pauter and Dyer-Witheford (2010)) *only if* human beings and populations have “the capacity to affect change in their collective development” (Dyer-Witheford (2006)). Such a capacity is defined as “a *constitutive power*, a bootstrapped, self-reinforcing loop of social co-operation, techno-scientific competencies and conscious awareness” (*ibidem*) that makes possible for members of collectivities to invent new modes of production and reproduction outside the orbit of commodities. Thus, consistently with classic Marxism, commonism requires that

⁵Gibson-Graham calls this process the circuit of “generative commons”. See Gibson-Graham (2006).

“individuals appropriate the existing totality of productive forces” (Marx and Engels (1970)) and

the appropriation of these forces is itself nothing more than the development of individual capacities corresponding to material instruments of production. The appropriation of a totality of instruments of production is, for this reason, the development of a totality of capacities in the individuals themselves (*ibidem*).

Consistently, if commonism wants to be an alternative to commodity-based capitalism, the importance of *capabilities for commons* is evident and self-sustaining. But, what are these capabilities for commons and how can they be developed and organized? Are they individual or collective entities, or both? And again, could be possible to develop these capabilities to give collectivities the freedom of self-governing the commons?

Unfortunately, neither analytical Marxism, nor radical Marxism, offer to commonism’s thinkers conceptual categories and tools to deal with capacities development, something on which Sen’s capability approach has a lot to say. Hence, in next paragraphs, in order to address the above issues, we shall use Sen’s capability approach to define and shape what capabilities for commons are and how they can be developed consistently with Ostrom’s principles for self-governing common-pool resources. Before doing this, in the next Section, we discuss a possible way to relate Marx and Sen’s ideas to commonism.

3 On Marx, Sen and commonism

Amartya Sen has publicly acknowledged his debt to Marx’s ideas,

notably for teaching us that the most terrible inequalities may be hidden behind an illusion of normality and justice (Sen (2006)).

Thus, does not surprise that many of his contributions to economics, social sciences, development studies or rationality theory have different roots in classic Marx’s works.

Firstly, as well known and evident from the above quotes, it is true that Marx did not use the term capabilities, and did not interpret them as a space of freedom, but he had strong in mind that human flourishing needs capacity development and freedom, exactly what Sen’s approach suggests. Sen himself quotes Marx in his seminal book, *Commodities and Capabilities*, at the very beginning as a basic reference. Both Sen and Marx place human well-being at the core of their reasoning and interpret human empowerment as the main force of liberation against inequality, deprivation and underdevelopment.

Secondly, Marx and Sen have repeatedly emphasized that commodities accumulation must not be the pillar of economic and social development. They have widely argued against commodity fetishism and reductionism and stressed that not all value elements can be *commoditized* as, for example, human dignity and freedom or the rights to creatively organize productive and re-productive activities.

Thirdly, Sen and Marx are also openly opposed to utilitarianism. A significant connection between their works, as pointed out by Qizilbash (2016), puts in relation the notion of “false consciousness” and their criticisms to the utilitarian tradition. More precisely, Sen proposes the idea of *objective illusion* to explain why a belief can be both positionally objective and false because of limitations of the position from which it has been developed (Sen (1993)). Because of this, a society can unwisely consider black people as inferior to white people and pretend to objectively justify such a belief by claiming the general validity of its, unfair and unsupported by evidence, positional parameters. When this happens, however, public reasoning, social dissent and free discussion should offer arguments against these wrong parameters and help the society at stake to disveal its ignorance and to objectively re-consider its position. If this process of beliefs auditing and revision do not start, the dominant class has very likely forged ideological forms to legitimate its ill-informed position. In Sen’s analysis, this leads to adaptive preferences, the perpetuation of an unjust status quo and the wrong assessment of individual well-being. In Marxian philosophy, as Sen himself has stressed, the use of the notion of objective illusion was in the context of commodity fetishism and led to what Marx called “false consciousness”. Let us remind what Engels wrote:

ideology is a process accomplished by the so-called social thinkers consciously, it is true, but with a false consciousness (Marx (1978))

and this is possible since

the class which has the means of material production at its disposal, has the control at the same time over the means of mental production, so that, thereby, generally speaking, the ideas of those who lack the means of production are subject to it (Marx (1977b)).

Thus, when the production of ideas reflects the material, uneven, conditions of life, and the dominant social group controls the means of mental production of desires and aspirations, any social change aimed to alter the status quo will be rejected because would ask to observe society from other-than-ruler’s viewpoints. This is the case of utilitarianism which suffers from objective illusion and false consciousness because its bias in favor of who can accumulate more efficiently utility (i.e. the bourgeoisie).

Finally, Marx and Sen are two important thinkers of the egalitarian tradition of social and political thought. They have largely discussed existing tensions between economic incentives and social justice, and emphasized in their writings the inability of market institutions to solve them⁶. Nevertheless, according to Sen’s ideas, public action can correct social injustices and inequalities and eliminate capabilities deprivations. Sen has never endorsed, like Marx did, the need to transcend capitalism and market institutions for achieving social justice and never evoked social struggles for ending domination, exploitation and the capitalist ideology. For this reason, the Marx that Sen has in mind is,

⁶On this point see Papaioannou (2016) and Fraser (2016).

as pointed out by Fraser (2016), a diluted Marx, the politically-correct social thinker appropriated by the analytical Marxism tradition⁷.

From a radical standpoint, more drastic measures to tackle injustices and failures of capitalism are necessary than seems to be admitted to by theorists such as Sen. This does not mean, however, that Sen's capability approach can offer interesting conceptual tools and categories for investigating which capabilities to function collectivities, communities and groups need to organize the circuit of the common.

According to commonism, for instance, Marx's thought suggests to value commodities in terms of their immaterial value for abstract labor, i.e. the production of ideas. Such an assessment, *inter alia*, requires that individuals can control means of mental production, can share and feed living, social knowledge and can exercise autonomous institutionality. Indeed, these are collective capabilities. Thereby, a relevant issue for commonism is whether communities, collectivities, groups and the like, have developed capabilities for managing, evolving and preserving global commons. Exactly those capacities emphasized in the above Marx's quote.

Furthermore, for self-governing the circuit of the common, social production, open education, collective ownership, self-valorization, shared-knowledge and autonomous institutionality are all needed and Sen's approach can tell us how to identify and assess capabilities for self-governance. For this sake, as we shall argue in the next Section, capabilities development must be designed consistently with Ostrom's principles for long-enduring, self-governance institutions for common-pool resources.

4 Capabilities for Self-Governing the Commons

For self-governing the circuit of common, collectivities needs education, trust, cohesion, full consciousness and complex skills, trans-positional objectivity and public reasoning. Hence, from a capability approach's perspective, we have to reason in terms of both individual and collective capabilities⁸. Furthermore, we need to specify on which self-governance domains these capabilities should operate and how they can be developed consistently with self-governance principles.

Our discussion is organized as follows: first of all, a simple taxonomy of capabilities to function is briefly outlined and shaped to deal with common goods governance issues; secondly, by taking inspiration from Ostrom's works, some domains for capabilities development are proposed.

4.1 Some Short Definitions

In Sen's version of the capability approach, the capability set is the set of all feasible functionings vectors an individual can achieve (and choose among) in

⁷ See Roemer (1989).

⁸ In what follows, I apply taxonomies for individual and collective capabilities to function I used in Lanzi (2007) and (2011). See those contributions for details and full references.

order to realize his/her well-being. Capabilities are freedoms, or causal powers (Martens (2006)), and they have both individual and collective dimensions.

First of all, they refer to individual's abilities, skills and knowledge (*S-caps*) without which individuals will face functionings achievement shortfalls.

Given some *S-caps*, the set of attainable life-paths strongly depends on external factors and social conditions which are not under direct individual control. These external capabilities (*E-caps*) are shaped by formal rights and rules, informal norms of behavior, ascribed social roles, community relations, peer-to-peer networks and the like. *E-caps* are also social capabilities in both possible meanings of the expression, that are: *collective capabilities*, i.e. capabilities can only be exploited by individuals as parts of groups, teams or collectivities; and *socially-dependent capabilities*, i.e. capabilities which are embedded in social structures and can only be exploited through social interaction.

Taken together, *S-caps* and *E-caps* shape individual freedoms in terms of possible functioning achievement vectors, or life-paths, the so-called option capabilities (*O-caps*).

Finally, *O-caps* are also shaped by, and interact with, moral capabilities (*M-caps*) which enables individuals to assess value judgments, to form purposes and identities, to discuss existing social modes of production and reproduction and go on. Some of these *M-caps* depend on individual traits, beliefs and attitudes, some others are genuinely social.

Along the circuit of common, the appropriation of productive forces by individuals and communities requires the development of these multi-folded capabilities at any stage of the process. Let us discuss why.

First of all, communities, social groups and collectivities must have the freedom to form associations for creatively managing and preserving a common good, but, for doing this, they need open education, sufficient resources and time for public debate and public reasoning. Further, legal rights and institutional rules should foster bottom-up, self-governance organizations based on collective ownership and democratic decision making. These emergent associations of individuals and communities would engage an open, informed and multi-disciplinary discussion about how to organize shared resources into productive/re-productive units and, in doing this, they would be entitled to introduce innovative goods, services or technologies with viral and non-proprietary licenses.

Secondly, once collective organizations and institutions for managing common goods are designed and established, members of collectivities need proper skills and entitlements for exploiting common-pool resources, moral awareness on preservation and/or expansion needs and relational abilities for managing conflicts and disputes.

Thirdly, if sharing a common-pool resource generates new production possibilities in terms of derived goods or services, democratic and not-profit-oriented production units (like cooperatives) would be free to operate in a clear, and reliable, normative framework through which to organize social production and peer-to-peer exchange without markets or hierarchies.

Finally, to organize rules that specify rights and duties of social producers, as well as to invest in new modes of production and usage, creates a second-

order common good that can support the birth of new forms of association for sharing more resources.

But, thence, if internal, external, collective, moral capabilities are all necessary for self-governing the commons, how can we restrict our reasoning and identify some relevant capabilities to start from?

4.2 Capabilities for Commons

Scientific contributions of Elinor Ostrom have largely investigated how to design long-enduring, common-pool resources institutions and under which conditions self-governance organizations can successfully operate in managing common goods. Take, for instance, the following list of design principles/conditions for long enduring, self-governance institutions⁹:

- clearly defined boundaries of common-pool resources and clearly defined access rights;
- congruence in benefits distribution with respect to the costs imposed by provision rules and local conditions;
- collective-choice agreements and collective monitoring;
- graduated sanctions and low-cost conflict resolution mechanisms;
- minimal recognition of the rights to organize.

Straightforwardly, individual, households or collectivities need a large array of capabilities to function in order to organize and manage all this. Without being exhaustive, we mention: internal, individual, *S-caps* for being able to assess relevant boundaries and their modifications with respect to time and usage; collective, *S-caps* to build a credible, long-enduring rights system based on well-specified criteria of local justice; collective *O-caps* that makes possible for any social group to have voice in the process of rights and entitlements creation; *S-caps*, both individualistically and collectively conceived, which support the development of socially-accountable, costs-benefits analysis frameworks; collective *S-caps*, for settling collective decision agreements, and *M-caps* for granting that collectivities can understand the moral consequences of any collective choice rule. Socially-dependent capabilities are also necessary in collective monitoring activities, conflicts resolution and sanctions enforcement as well as multi-folded, democratic social interaction would ensure to all groups sufficient *O-caps* for being politically autonomous and not challenged by external governmental authorities.

Finally, all above capabilities would be common-good specific, dynamic by nature and more difficult to develop in large size, heterogeneous, collectivities, like those supposed to manage global commons, than in small, cohesive groups. Cultivating humanity for the common suffers, thereby, of both over-specification

⁹The list is adapted from the one presented in Ostrom (2000).

and under-specification problems. On the one hand, a general, exhaustive panel of capabilities for commons would contain as many entries as needed to empower individuals and groups in a post-capitalistic order in which the common has subverted the capital. Surely, a very long list. On the other hand, many of these capabilities could be difficult to see before the circuit of the common is unfolded. Thence, to start from a short, not-exhaustive list can be useful.

Hereafter, I propose to restrict the field to seven basic domains of human capabilities that, if grievously under-developed, can preclude our abilities and options to deal with the circuit of common:

- (i) being able to work collaboratively and collectively;
- (ii) being able to operate according to a non-profit, non-individual philosophy;
- (iii) being able to act in a non-rivalrous, non-competitive fashion to explore new models for property, ownership and exchange;
- (iv) being able to take a creative and open political approach to social change and to engage with existing institutions;
- (v) being able to offer gift labor for developing notions of community, the common and common goods;
- (vi) being able to use different interpretation frames and to manage diversity;
- (vii) being able to take account of, and to assume an, intra-active relation with the non-human.

Not only our common future is at stake, but also what kind of human beings we want to be commonly.

5 Concluding Remarks

Individuals participating in and sharing commons can sustain social change. When an individual joins a group, and acts collectively, due to the common, he/she generates changing and diverse stimulations, creating changing and diverse actions/reactions in other group members. In this way, sharing commons and working with others for such a result can create some important modifications in the way we define and develop our social self and perceive the common. Moreover, for individuals actively involved in commons management and preservation, everyday activities are focused on achieving the productive/reproductive conditions such that common.pool resources can satisfy some collective needs. In this way, individuals develop their agency by participating in the social creation of living conditions. Productive results are freely accessible to all and the organization of operating activities is carried out by participants themselves, i.e. participants determine rules of cooperation, decision-making procedures and conflict management mechanisms.

On this basis, the common can be seen as a possible, new paradigm for societal reproduction. According to commonism, the needs-based exchange does not take place *ex post*, as it is usual with commodities, but before production. Before productive activities are implemented, different wishes and requirements of participants, as well as social conditions and priorities, are communicated, discussed

and reconciled using democratic methods. Further, interpersonal relationships of reciprocity that the common forms are usually *unconditional* (no conditional linking of taking to giving), *peer-to-peer* and *including*. Self-selection of activities based on voluntariness ensures truly motivated actions, while cooperation and reciprocity permit general relations of inclusion to emerge (Neumuller and Meretz (2019)). In this paper, we have suggested that these inclusive relations are more likely to phase out if above capabilities for commons are granted and developed at different levels along the circuit of common.

References

- [1] Blomquist W., Ostrom E. (1985) "Institutional Capacity and the Resolution of a Commons Dilemma", *Policy Review Studies*, 5(2), pp.383-93
- [2] Dasgupta P. (1982) "*The Control of Resources*", Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA
- [3] Dyer-Witheford N. (2006) 'Species being and the new commonism: Notes on an interrupted cycle of struggle', *The Commoner*, 11, pp.15-32
- [4] Dyer-Witheford N. (2007) 'Commonism', *Turbulence*, 1(1), pp.28-9
- [5] Fraser I. (2016) "Sen, Marx and Justice: a critique", *International Journal of Social Economics*, 43(12), pp.1194-1206
- [6] Gibson-Graham J.K. (2006) "*A Post capitalistic Politics*", University of Minnesota Press, Minneapolis, MN
- [7] Hardin G. (1968) "The Tragedy of Commons", *Science*, 162(1), pp.243-48
- [8] Lanzi D. (2007) "Human Capital, Capabilities and Education", *Journal of Socio-Economics*, 36(3), pp.424-35
- [9] Lanzi D. (2011) "Capabilities and Social Cohesion", *Cambridge Journal of Economics*, 35(6), pp.1087-1101
- [10] Martins N. (2006) "Capabilities as Causal Powers", *Cambridge Journal of Economics*, 30, pp.671-85
- [11] Marx K. (1977a) "*Capital Vol 1.*", Vintage, New York
- [12] Marx K. (1977b) "*Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts*", Progressive Publishers, Moscow
- [13] Marx K. (1978) "*The Marx-Engels Reader*", Norton, London
- [14] Marx K. (1981) "*Capital Vol.2*", Vintage, New York
- [15] Marx K., Engels F. (1970) "*The German Ideology, Part One*", Lawrence and Wishart, London
- [16] Neumuller D., Meretz S. (2019) "Generalized Agency and Commonism", *Kritische Psychologie. Annual Review of Critical Psychology*, 16, pp.333-53
- [17] Ostrom E. (1990) "*Governing the Commons: The Evolution of Institutions for Collective Action*", Cambridge University Press, New York
- [18] Ostrom E. (2000) "Reformulating the Commons", *Swiss Political Science Review*, 6(1), pp.29-52

- [19] Papaioannou T. (2016) “Marx and Sen on Incentives and Justice: Implications for Innovation and Development”, *Progress in Development Studies*, 16(4), pp.297-313
- [20] Peuter de G., Dyer-Witthford N. (2010) “Commons and Cooperatives”, *Affinities*, 4(1), pp.30-56
- [21] Qizilbash M. (2016) “Capability, Objectivity and “False Consciousness”: on Sen, Marx and J.S. Mill”, *International Journal of Social Economics*, 43(12), pp.1207-18
- [22] Roemer J. (1986) “*Analytical Marxism*”, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge
- [23] Rose C. (1986) “The Comedy of Commons: custom, commerce and inherently public property”, *The University of Chicago Law Review*, 53(3), pp.711-81
- [24] Robeyns I. (2005) “The Capability Approach: a theoretical survey”, *Journal of Human Development*, 6(1), pp.93-117
- [25] Robeyns I. (2016) “Capabilitarianism”, *Journal of Human Development and Capabilities*, 17(3), pp.397-414
- [26] Sen A.K. (1980) “Equality of What?”, in McMurrin S. (ed.), “*Tanner Lectures on Human Values*”, University of Utah Press, Salt Lake City, pp.196-200
- [27] Sen A.K. (1985) “*Commodities and Capabilities*”, North Holland, Amsterdam
- [28] Sen A.K. (1987) “*The Standard of Living*”, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge
- [29] Sen A.K. (1993) “Positional Objectivity”, *Philosophy and Public Affairs*, 22(2), pp.126-45
- [30] Sen A.K. (2006) “What do we want from a Theory of Justice?”, *Journal of Philosophy*, 103(2), pp.215-38